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BOOK REVIEW

The Principles of Sociology: An Analysis of the Phenomena of Association and of Social Organization. By Franklin Henry Giddings, M. A. New York and London, Macmillan and Company, 1896. Pp. i–xvi, 1–476.

"The time has not come for an exhaustive treatise on sociology. Nevertheless the scientific description of society is well advanced, and there is no reason why it should remain inarticulate." So opens the preface to this pioneer treatise; and on the foundation thus outlined the superstructure of the work is erected in accordance with the designs of the economist rather than those of the general anthropologist, yet in such manner as fairly to accommodate both classes of tenants. It is a model of systematic arrangement, the quadripartite symmetry being the more noteworthy because much of the material has been used before in different connections. There are four "books," each divided into four chapters, and the work ends with a classified bibliography occupying twenty pages, and an admirable index.

The first "book" is "The Elements of Social Theory." The initial chapter recounts the gradual development of the sociologic idea—the slow and halting recognition on the part of certain students that there is need for a science whose unit is not the individual but the group; and this science is clearly discriminated by Professor Giddings and, after Auguste Comte, denominated *sociology*. Perceiving (like other students) that while this science of the collective is fundamentally and essentially distinct from all other sciences it is nevertheless difficult to formulate its fundamental characters, Professor Giddings then seeks the primary sociologic postulate and concludes that "The original and elementary subjective fact in society is *the consciousness of kind*" (page 17), the context and other references indicating that the formula might be more exactly written *the cognition of our* (or *my*) *kind.*

Passing in the second chapter to the province of sociology, Professor Giddings is led to a classification of the sciences in such terms as to define the position of the collective science. The essential and admirable feature of this classification is recognition of the fact that any science may be either concrete or abstract, according to the aspect in which it is viewed. "It is therefore more accurate to class a science as abstract if it is concerned chiefly with relations, properties, or forces and only incidentally with aggregates. * * * A science is concrete if its chief aim is to explain aggregates as such, though it deals also with properties and forces and uses the methods of abstraction. * * * Thus instead of one linear series of sciences there are two distinct orders of sciences, so related to each other as to make cross-classifications in every part of the intricate domain of knowledge" (page 48). Accordingly the "domain of knowledge" is grouped in horizontal zones, corresponding to objects-matter, comprising chemistry, astronomy, geology, biology, psychology, and sociology, and the several zones are divided into vertical columns defined by subjects-matter or methods, including mathematics, physics, economics, ethics, and politics. Through this arrangement it is shown graphically that the closest affiliations of sociology are with psychology, and that in their descriptive aspect both presuppose the concrete physical sciences, while on their explanatory side they are mathematical, physical, economical, and ethical, every one of the abstract sciences contributing "principles of interpretation to concrete psychology and concrete sociology" (page 50). In the third chapter the methods of sociology are set forth as observation and description, accompanied by retrospection and history, followed by explanation, generalization, and verification; the methods being precisely those in use in other branches of science dealing with simpler objects-matter. Then the problems of sociology are shown (in chapter iv) to be in part primary and in part secondary, the primary problems including those of (1) aggregation, (2) association and coöperation, (3) social characteristics, and (4) social classes, while the secondary problems relate to process, law, and cause.

The second "book" deals with "The Elements and Structure of Society," and comprises chapters on the social population, the social mind, the social composition, and the social constitution. Beginning with gregarious mammals, birds, and insects, and rising into human tribes and nations, it is shown that the grouping of organisms, which gives basis to the science of the collective, ranges from simple aggregation to definite association in which the grouping is purposive and designed for the common good, and also that "association reacts upon the associating individuals and modifies their natures" (page 121) in such manner as to develop collective characteristics—*i. e.*, characteristics which isolated individuals could neither acquire nor retain. The fifty-three pages of chapter I in this "book" are too rich and suggestive for condensation. This part of the treatise alone would suffice to establish the elements of the science which Professor Giddings undertakes to expound, since it sets forth clearly not only the development of collective relations, but the genesis of collective characteristics. A single collective character may be specially noted, partly by way of illustration: It is shown that a prime requisite in aggregation as well as in association is mutual tolerance, which is the germ of justice, and that it is only through *toleration* that coöperation and alliance become possible. Several of the almost innumerable consequences of this principle are developed. Passing to the consideration of the social mind, the author sets forth the essentially collective features of mentality, including self-consciousness, sense of justice, and belief. Next it is shown that the social composition comprises units of widely diverse orders of magnitude, the most important of which are the family, the ethnic (or kindred) group, and the demotic group, in which the altruism of humanity rises above the egoism of consanguinity. Under the social constitution, forms of organization are discussed in respect to genesis, as well as in their static aspects, and incidentally it is shown that "the analogy of the social constitution to the constitution of a biotic organism is real" (page 194), the organization, like the organism, being the product of interaction between hereditary characters and environmental conditions.

In the third "book" "The Historical Evolution of Society" is traced after the manner of biotic phylogeny. Beginning with zoögenic association, which is adaptive rather than purposive, it is shown that among gregarious (and indeed among most other) animals the collective characters growing out of association may be either beneficial or injurious to the species, and thus enter the domain of natural selection in which the beneficent among characters are preserved while the maleficent are destroyed, and it is intimated (and might well be more strongly emphasized) that the effect of interaction between individual organisms and collective characters is cumulative, tending ever toward the development of common features and thus toward altruism and solidarity. Passing, then, to anthropogenic association (chapter II), Professor

Giddings discusses the effects of continuity in society and the genesis of human nature, and proceeds to a speculation concerning the origin of races and more specific consideration of the growth of economic, juridical, political, esthetic, and religious ideas, and the concomitant development of the human mind in contradistinction from the animal mind of the zoögenic stage, the chapter being a notably suggestive exposition of the relatively simple and direct processes by which the relatively complex social structure has been produced. In the succeeding chapter on ethnogenic association these processes are considered with reference to the family, clan, and tribe, and under demogenic association (chapter IV) they are extended to the multifarious groups and institutions of civilized nations.

The fourth "book" is devoted to consideration of "Social Process, Law, and Cause." In the first chapter the social process is treated from the physical, and in the second from the psychical standpoint; and it is shown that the agencies and conditions of social development are in every respect comparable or identical with those characteristic of the mineral, vegetal, and animal worlds, save for the fundamental distinction in unit—the individual in other sciences, the group in the science of the collective. The plain and straightforward common sense of these chapters cannot fail to delight those readers who appreciate this quality of human understanding. In the succeeding chapter social law and cause are treated in accordance with the methods pursued in the third "book," and the treatise closes with a chapter on the nature and end of society, in which the analogy between organisms and organizations is reiterated and amplified.

Taken as a whole, the treatise is noteworthy for originality and strong individuality, no less than for the fact that it enters a comparatively virgin field lying between the provinces of pure anthropology and applied anthropology. The author pushes out from the latter province, and though gratifyingly successful in grasping the methods pursued in the former, sometimes betrays unfamiliarity with its cultivators and the fruits of their labors—*e. g.*, he quotes from early records of superficial observation to invalidate conclusions of the most experienced scientific student of the American Indians now living (page 163), and throughout misspells the name of a leading anthropologist, though an associate of his own in the university whence the work practically emanates! Thus the volume, especially in the second and third "books," has an empiric rather than a scientific air, which is measurably misleading, since the exact statement, the excellent arrangement, the sensible and straightforward treatment, and above all the definite recognition of the basis of the science of the collective, give it decided scientific value.

To the reviewer the classification and nomenclature expressed in the arrangement and titles seem hardly happy. Among many students of anthropology the term sociology has come into use as a designation for the science of institutions, and is thus made coördinate with somatology, pyschology, linguistics, technology, and mythology (or sophiology), while some students use the term demology (or demonomy) to designate, in its various aspects, the vast science whose units are organizations, small or great, akin or alien, adaptive or purposive; and in accordance with this usage it would seem desirable either to limit somewhat the scope of the work to fit its title, or to enlarge the scope under a broader title. This suggestion need not be developed; it suffices to note that the elaborate and in many respects excellent nomenclature of the author will probably be found to require revision as the time for "an exhaustive treatise on sociology" approaches.

Again, it would seem to the reviewer that Professor Giddings' formula for the science of the collective (*consciousness of kind*) is hardly suitable as a basis either for the science of institutions or for the science of organizations; for the former it is too narrow, since institutions are essentially purposive and beneficent, and for the latter it is much too general, since organization is at the outset largely or wholly adaptive, antedating consciousness or even cognition as these terms are ordinarily employed. Thus *consciousness of kind* implies the classific faculty, and even *cognition of* (*our*) *kind* implies self-consciousness, apperception, discrimination, coördination, and other mental processes of considerable complexity and advanced development, so that the formula is inapplicable to phytogenic and zoögenic association, as well as to the lower stages of anthropogenic union. Again, it has been shown[1] that the plants of desert regions gather in communities, where they are joined by animals, so that the life of the desert is communal and in some measure commensal, to the common benefit of the participants; it might be shown that the horse and other domestic animals have lost their original characters so completely that their intelligence is but a reflection of the human mind, while their fealty to man is stronger than kinship bond; and in these and many other cases it is manifest that the basis of organization must be, among part or all of the participants, purely adaptive and independent of intelligent recognition either of *our* kind or of kind in general. As Professor Giddings justly urges, a formula for demotic science is greatly needed; but the reviewer is disposed to question whether the essentially distinct (and to most people elusive) idea of the collective unit can be expressed in terms which were adopted and are habitually used to convey knowledge concerning individual units; for although the methods are similar, the intellectual chasm separating demology from all of the other sciences is many times broader and more profound than the break between any other two sciences. The fundamental process distinguishing demology throughout its entire range would seem to the reviewer one of inter-adjustment, either passive or active, either spontaneous or enforced, and either adaptive or purposive, between two or more individuals, the adjustment being of such character as to combine the individuals in systems. Since there is no term in any language known to him to express its essential idea, he is tempted to stamp the process *conjustment*. It is confidently opined that the use of some such term, with a clear definition, will tend to elucidate and establish the elements of the science foreshadowed by Plato and Aristotle, conceived by Comte, nurtured by Spencer and Ward, and rendered articulate by Giddings.

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[1] "The Beginning of Agriculture," American Anthropologist, vol. VIII, October, 1895, p. 350 *et seq.*

The work has been favorably noticed elsewhere, notably by Patten (in *Science*, new series, volume III, 1896, pages 709–711), who suggests that the attributes of social beings, presumptively of the higher orders, be combined under the term *socialry;* Ward has reviewed it extensively and critically (especially in *Annals of the American Academy*, volume VIII, 1896, pages 1–31); while Spencer (*Popular Science Monthly*, volume L, 1896, pages 163–171) has pointed out that some of his ideas have been adopted by Professor Giddings without adequate recognition of their source.

W J McGee.